1		BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC.
2		BEFORE THE
3		PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
4		<b>DOCKET NO. 2003-326-</b> C
5		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
6		DR. RANDALL S. BILLINGSLEY, CFA
7		MARCH 31, 2004
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9		I. INTRODUCTION
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11	Q.	Please state your name, occupation, and business address.
12	A.	My name is Randall S. Billingsley. I am a finance professor at Virginia Polytechnic
13		Institute and State University. I also act as a financial consultant in the areas of cost of
14		capital analysis, financial security analysis, and valuation. My business address is:
15		Department of Finance, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
16		State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0221.
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18		This surrebuttal testimony presents my independent professional opinions and is not
19		presented by me as a representative of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
20		University.
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- 1 Q. Have you previously submitted testimony in this proceeding on behalf of BellSouth
- **Telecommunications Corporation (BST)?**
- 3 A. Yes.

## II. PURPOSE OF SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY AND SUMMARY OF

#### 6 CONCLUSIONS

#### A. PURPOSE OF SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

# 9 Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A. My purpose is to critically evaluate the cost of capital-related portions of the rebuttal testimonies of two other witnesses in this proceeding. First, I evaluate Mr. Don J. Wood's rebuttal testimony filed on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern States, L.L.C. (AT&T), which is dated March 12, 2004. I show that his rebuttal testimony provides no insight into the current capital costs faced by competing local exchange companies (CLECs) in general or any specific insight into the appropriate discount rate to be used in the BellSouth Analysis of CLEC Entry (BACE) model. Second, I evaluate Dr. Robert Loube's rebuttal testimony filed on behalf of Staff of the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, which is dated March 12, 2004. I explain that his attempted revision of my recommended cost of capital for use in the BACE model is incorrect and unsupported by any empirical evidence or independent analysis. Below I summarize my analysis of Mr. Wood's rebuttal testimony. Given the limited scope of Dr. Loube's comments on the cost of capital, I present my analysis of his testimony in section IV below after my analysis of Mr. Wood's testimony.

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## B. SUMMARY OF SURREBUTTAL OF MR. DON J. WOOD'S

## REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF AT&T

#### COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES, L.L.C.

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#### Q. What issues does your surrebuttal focus on in Mr. Wood's rebuttal testimony 6 concerning the CLEC industry's capital costs?

My surrebuttal shows that most of Mr. Wood's testimony provides nothing more than unsupported speculations concerning CLEC capital costs and the rest presents inconsistent and incorrect arguments that leave us with no evidence on current CLEC capital costs. Importantly, Mr. Wood provides absolutely no estimates of CLEC capital costs. I identify numerous examples of his unsupported personal opinions in my surrebuttal. Further, I focus on Mr. Wood's inconsistent and incorrect argument that currently operating CLECs possess inefficient, sub-optimal capital structures and yet at the same time somehow are economically efficient. This contradictory argument dramatizes his misunderstanding of the information provided by currently operating, market-traded CLECs concerning their capital costs. I also evaluate Mr. Wood's misguided projection that past CLEC infrastructure investments and associated bankruptcies will necessarily be repeated in the future. In summary, Mr. Wood's unsupported and incorrect observations tell us nothing meaningful about the appropriate discount rate that should be used in the BACE model.

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1		III. ANALYSIS OF MR. DON J. WOOD'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ON
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3		A. QUALIFICATIONS AS A COST OF CAPITAL EXPERT
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5	Q.	Are you familiar with Mr. Wood's testimony as a cost of capital expert in other
6		regulatory proceedings?
7	A.	No. While I have read and rebutted Mr. Wood's testimony in other regulatory proceedings,
8		in my experience he has always simply summarized the cost of capital recommendations
9		made by the cost of capital expert(s) working in the given case. I am not familiar with any
10		independent work done by Mr. Wood as a cost of capital expert. I am consequently
11		surprised that he appears to consider himself a cost of capital expert in the current
12		proceeding and I know of no basis for doing so.
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14		B. EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING MR. WOOD'S ASSUMPTION OF
15		CLEC INEFFICIENCY
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17	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. Wood's position that CLECs are currently operating
18		efficiently?
19	A.	No, I believe that the evidence contradicts Mr. Wood's position. He incorrectly argues
20		that:
21		the fact that a significant number of CLECs have gone bankrupt suggests
22		that competitive market constraints have winnowed the field and those CLECs
23		that currently are operating do have efficient operations. In order to make

reasonable assumptions about efficient CLEC costs, it is logical to look at currently operating CLECs (Rebuttal Testimony, p. 50, lines 5 - 10).

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Mr. Wood's argument reduces to unsupported speculation that CLECs that did not go bankrupt are, by definition, necessarily operating efficiently. As shown in my direct testimony in this proceeding, the average bond rating for a sample of market-traded CLECs is CCC+/CCC (see Billingsley Exhibit No. RSB-6). This is a speculative-grade bond rating that is associated with firms in financial distress. Consider the following definition of the CCC-level rating:

An obligation rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment, and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation (Standard & Poor's Bond Guide, October 2003, p. 4).

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It is absolutely amazing that Mr. Wood argues that such firms should be used "... to make reasonable assumptions about efficient CLEC costs." The evidence obviously contradicts this. Further, Mr. Wood's reliance on unadjusted data drawn from inefficient CLECs is inconsistent with the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) assertion that the cost of capital should reflect a forward-looking, efficient network (see Triennial Review Order, In Re Review of the Section 251, Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, First Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 03-36, released August, 21, 2003, pp. 419-420, §682).

# C. INCONSISTENT ARGUMENT THAT CLEC CAPITAL STRUCTURES

#### ARE NOT EFFICIENT

- Q. After arguing that CLECs are currently operating efficiently, does Mr. Wood also argue that current CLEC capital structures are not efficient, target capital structures?
- 8 A. Yes. Mr. Wood states:

This structure is clearly not the target capital structure of these companies, but has arisen in large part because of the precipitous drop in the companies' stock prices (Rebuttal Testimony, p. 57, lines 18 - 20).

Mr. Wood is inconsistent. On one hand he argues that CLECs are efficient and a reasonable source of representative capital costs. Yet on the other hand he argues that their current capital structure is not equal to their target, optimal capital structure. His only explanation for this contradictory speculation concerning current CLEC capital structures is that they are the result of the "precipitous drop in the companies' stock prices." Mr. Wood's contradictory, inconsistent argument does not make sense. The truth that must be faced is that CLECs are not currently efficient in a comprehensive sense. It is consequently reasonable to use the averaging process that I do to produce a representative bounded estimate of representative CLEC capital costs. It is eminently appropriate to bound current CLEC costs on the downside with the S&P 500 and on the upside with capital costs produced by a CLEC sample, which is obviously in an inefficient condition.

## D. MR. WOOD'S SPECULATIONS CONCERNING CLEC FUTURE

#### INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS

# 5 Q. What speculation does Mr. Wood make concerning future CLEC infrastructure

6 investments based on history?

7 A. The gist of Mr. Wood's speculation is that CLECs have no capacity to understand or to avoid their past mistakes. He states that:

... CLECs invested in network infrastructure (large fixed costs) based on an anticipation of future revenues that would make their market entry economic. Their assumptions regarding whether entry in this manner would be economic, now clearly flawed, are very similar to the assumptions that BellSouth is now inviting CLECs to make through the results of its business case analysis (and is asking the Commission to conclude that the CLEC's should accept the invitation). ... CLECs face a decision of whether or not to invest in network infrastructure (in this case a local circuit switch, whose cost characteristics cause it to represent a large fixed cost). BellSouth argues that they could rationally do so ... (Rebuttal Testimony, p. 54, line 27 - p. 55, line 10).

Thus, Mr. Wood attributes the CLECs past woes to network infrastructure investments with "large fixed costs" and predicts that CLECs will necessarily experience the same troubles again in the future. However, I do not share Mr. Wood's uncomplimentary view of the CLECs' ability to learn from past challenges. The future is not necessarily a simple extension of the past and learning is possible.

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2		E. RELATIVE RISK OF CLECS AND ILECS
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4	Q.	Does Mr. Wood provide any evidence to support his position that CLECs face higher
5		risks than incumbent local exchange companies (ILEC's)?
6	A.	No. Mr. Wood offers no evidence on the relative riskiness of CLECs and ILECs. He only
7		expresses his unsupported opinion as follows:
8		There is a fundamental difference in the risk incurred by a former monopoly
9		provider, with existing network facilities and an existing base of customers, and
10		the risk incurred by a new entrant to enter the market by making a large fixed
11		investment without the customer base needed to recover the cost of that
12		investment (Rebuttal Testimony, p. 53, lines 1 - 5).
13		He then speculates that " a CLEC continues to face, for the reasons described above,
14		much higher risk than an ILEC" (Rebuttal Testimony, p. 54, lines 9 - 11).
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16		While CLECs may well be riskier than ILECs, any possible difference should be
17		demonstrated using empirical evidence rather than assumed. Mr. Wood speculates about
18		the relative risks of ILECs and CLECs when evidence is needed, not his opinion.
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20		IV. ANALYSIS OF DR. LOUBE'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ON
21		BEHALF OF STAFF OF THE PUBLIC SERIVCE COMMISSION OF

**SOUTH CAROLINA** 

- 2 Q. What is your assessment of Dr. Loube's revision of your estimated cost of capital
- **for use in the BACE model?**
- 4 A. Dr. Loube rejects my estimation approach without providing any basis for doing so.
- 5 Further, he incorrectly revises my analysis, in part, by doubling the amount of equity
- in the representative CLEC's capital structure "[b]y making a conservative
- adjustment to the CLEC average equity percentage, increasing the percentage from
- 8 12.47 percent to 25.0 percent ..." (Rebuttal Testimony, p. 39, lines 12 14).
- 9 However, he provides no empirical justification for this revision nor any independent
- cost of capital estimates. Consequently, Dr. Loube only attempts to substitute his
- unsupported opinion for the results of my empirically-supported cost of capital
- estimate for use in the BACE model. Dr. Loube's rebuttal testimony provides no
- useful evidence concerning CLEC capital costs.

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#### V. SUMMARY OF COST OF CAPITAL ANALYSIS FOR BACE MODEL

- 17 Q. Please summarize your recommendation concerning the appropriate pre-tax overall
- cost of capital that should be used to calculate the NPV in the BACE model.
- 19 A. As presented in my previously filed direct testimony in this proceeding, my cost of capital
- 20 estimation approach adapts to the data problems resulting from the current troubled
- environment facing the CLEC industry. I essentially provide "ceiling" and "floor"
- estimates of the industry's capital costs. Thus, I use two surrogates to measure the
- representative CLEC's capital costs. I use the S&P 500 as a lower-bound or minimum

estimate of the representative CLEC's cost of capital and I also use a sample of publiclytraded CLECs that provides an upper-bound or maximum estimate of the representative CLEC's cost of capital. I then provide a reasonable estimate of the industry's overall

capital costs by averaging the results of my two approaches.

My analysis indicates that a forward-looking cost of equity estimate for the representative CLEC is an average of 17.55%. I also find evidence that the cost of debt of the representative CLEC is an average of 9.92%. The average market value-based capital structure of firms is 58.50% debt and 41.50% equity. Combining this average capital structure with the above average costs of debt and equity produces an average pre-tax overall cost of capital for the representative CLEC of 13.09%. This bounded averaging approach provides the most reasonable estimate of efficient CLEC capital costs in the current environment.

In summary, I recommend that the Public Service Commission of South Carolina use a *before-tax* overall cost of capital of 13.09% as an input in the BACE business case model. This cost of capital should be adjusted to reflect the effect of taxes before using it to discount the after-tax cash flows generated by the BACE model.

# Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?

21 A. Yes, it does.